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Indentured Servitude
By Michael Bertin
JUNE 22, 1998:
It's a conditioned response. "'We got a good deal,' yeah, everybody says
that," affirms Davis McLarty, a local booking agent who has coached many young
Austin artists through the process of negotiating recording contracts. "You're
not going to walk away going, 'Yeah, we got a bad deal.'" Because a recording
contract - "a record deal" - remains the brass ring of the music industry,
it fairly goes without saying that most musicians never met a record deal they didn't
like. It's only natural, as well, that when asked about their contract, these same
artists respond just as McLarty posited. Unfortunately, there's no such thing
as a "good record deal." The numbers are so stacked against the people
making the music that, as recent Atlantic Records signee David Garza noted, "It
only works for the artist if more than a million copies are sold. Period."
The obvious problem with that, of course, is that of the approximate 30,000 albums
released every year, less than one percent go platinum (certified sales of one million),
meaning there are very few recording artists for whom the record deal is actually
working.
This problem is further compounded by the fact that very few musicians know what
their record contract actually says. Which is quite understandable; the average Egyptologist
had a better shot at deciphering hieroglyphics before the discovery of the Rosetta
Stone than the average musician today has of making heads or tails out of their recording
contract. This turns out to be, perhaps, the worst problem of all since those pages
upon pages of tediously rigid terminology, obscure even to the legally trained, hold
the financial fate of an artist.
"When people bring their little record deals to me, they're always just stunned,"
says Cindi Lazzari, an Austin entertainment lawyer who has worked deals for local
artists such as Eric Johnson, Charlie Robison, and Chris Duarte. "They're kids
and they don't know. [They say], 'I can never afford a lawyer, I'm just going to
sign it, because this is what they do.' So they sign it, and then they're screwed
forever - or at least for a long time."
Suppose you do sign a deal. Sometime thereafter you will go into the studio and
make an album, the label will then release it, and if all goes well, people will
go to record stores and start buying it. Once that happens, money should start trickling
in via two different revenue streams.
Because a recording contract remains
the brass ring of the music industry, it fairly goes without saying that most musicians
never met a record deal they didn't like.
The first source of revenue comes through artist royalties - what the band, singer,
or whoever's name is on the CD spine gets for the performance on the recording. Royalties
are often referred to as the "artist share," and that's a bit of a misnomer,
because "share" isn't really an accurate description of how things get
divided up, according to Ron Byrd of local band Prescott Curlywolf. "The terms
for a record deal are not good," he grumbles.
In recording contracts, artist royalties are negotiated in "points."
When industry people use that locution - "We'll give you 15 points" - they're
referring to the percentage points they pay an artist on each album sold. If a band
gets 15 points that means it gets 15 percent of the retail cost of each album.
Artist share is generally going to be in the vicinity of 15 points - occasionally
more, usually less. Rob Bernard, also of Prescott Curlywolf (and the Damnations),
recalls that P-Wolf got 13 points in their deal with Mercury Records. Like most facets
of a recording contract, this is negotiable; if there's interest from multiple labels,
a band can use that to try and leverage a greater artist share. Jason McMaster of
the now defunct Austin metal outfit Dangerous Toys claims that so many labels were
interested in his band once upon a time (circa 1988), they swung 15 points in their
deal with Columbia.
That royalty rate, however, will be "all in." That means that if anyone
else is getting points, say a producer, they will be paid out of the artist's share.
In other words, if an artist who negotiated 15 points for themselves scores a big-name
producer that commands a two-point fee, those two points are subtracted from the
artist's share, leaving them with only 13 points.

Illustration by Jason Stout
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Think about that for a moment. The musician who makes the damn album in the first
place is doing well to get 15 percent of the take. It's axiomatic that the creative
element in any endeavor is typically paid only slightly better than the interns,
and yet the recording industry has many other ways of further reducing the artists'
actual take and leaving them in something akin to indentured servitude - a term that
just about everybody in the know on record deals uses to describe the situation.
First, almost all major label contracts stipulate that an artist be paid royalties
on only 85 percent of the albums sold. This is actually a remnant deduction left
over from the earliest days of vinyl. Occasionally said petroleum product would break
during shipment. Since retailers couldn't sell broken records, the record companies
decided not to pay royalties on them either. As a result, a 10 percent breakage factor
became customary. Today, even though CDs generally don't break during shipment, the
deduction has not only stayed, it's increased. So, for seemingly no reason other
than they can, record companies are not going to pay you for every album you sell.
Moreover, a typical contract will also have a free goods deduction, reading something
like "two shipped free for every 10." This is more entrenched language,
like the damaged goods deduction; per an agreement through labels and distributors,
record companies used to put two free records in every box of 10 shipped. Distributors
got 12 records, but they only paid for 10, while artists only got royalties on the
10 that were paid for. It's a record contract fixture even though today most major
labels are their own distributors. This means that with the free goods deduction,
record companies are giving themselves two CDs gratis so they can avoid paying
artist royalties on them.
Finally, there's what's called a packaging deduction; artwork, insert booklets,
jewel boxes, and shrink wrap all cost money, and the labels don't want to pay artist
royalties on those expenses, so they don't. Typically, labels deduct a whopping 25
percent off the retail price of a CD for the costs of packaging it. Again, royalty
rates are generally paid on the list price, so with the packaging deduction alone,
a recording artist can lose a full quarter of his "artist share." The massive
deduction is something akin to theft.
"The fact is that it's a total myth," Lazzari admits. "Packaging
doesn't cost them that much."
Free goods? Packaging deductions? How do record companies get away with depriving
artists of a sizable portion of the money due them? Fastball guitarist Miles Zuniga
explains:
"That, my friend, is what's called the industry standard. When you ask your
attorney to take those out [of the contract], he will say, 'Well it's an industry
standard,' meaning standard for you but not for Madonna. In this way, record companies
can screw new artists and not have to worry about it because everybody does it. As
you become Madonna, you can renegotiate and have these things taken out."
What on the surface looks like a bad deal for artists - having their small share
nickel and dimed even more - is actually worse than it seems. It's so bad that McLarty
warns young bands right up front.
"I always tell bands you're not going to make money off of artist royalties
on a major label, nobody does. Nobody does."
Why? Because there are all kinds of costs associated with being on a label and
making records, and those costs are recoupable. In label lingo, "recoupable"
simply means that the record company wants that money back. Not only do they want
it back, but the artist is going to have to pay for it out of their share - those
piddley 15 points less all the other percentage deductions - before seeing any cash
themselves. As Dangerous Toys' McMaster attests, those recoupable costs add up fast.
"We got out of having to pay back about $1 million," admits McMaster.
"It's pretty amazing to even be able to say that shit, but the stuff happens.
The money exchanges hands like people change underwear. "
Among recoupable costs is the advance. That's the money an artist gets for signing
with a label. Advances have a tremendous range - maybe as low as $30,000 for an artist
that signs without much fanfare to $250,000 or better for bands caught up in a bidding
war. In fact, in a bidding war, things can get downright out of hand. Radish, that
kid grunge band from Dallas that sold approximately nothing, is rumored to have received
around $800,000 for signing with Mercury.
If you're really hot property, however, you may get a signing bonus. This is not
recoupable. This is free money - money for you to spend as you wish and not have
to worry about paying back. Woo hoo! Almost nobody get this (D'oh!), although word
has it that Kacy Crowley's advance from Atlantic Records was actually a bonus of
this kind.
Typically, advance money will be what an artist uses to pay for recording their
album - as well as covering living expenses. Even though all this money is recoupable,
however, what you don't spend in the studio you can put in your pocket. And you will
need it, too, because it's hard to keep your day job at Quack's when you're in a
recording studio in Los Angeles.
And videos! That's recoupable money as well. And like anything else in the music
business, costs can quickly get out of hand. As a self-described hippie without a
perm during his Dangerous Toys hey-day, McMaster was somewhat bewildered when the
band showed up to do its first video and saw a make-up artist and stylist on the
set and on the payroll - their payroll.
"Those people were there to make us look good. I understand that," says
McMaster. "But out of control is out of control. It would have been nice to
go, 'We don't need this, we don't need this, we don't need this. And we don't need
this.' But I'm in Texas getting on a plane to go out there and start shooting a video.
I show up and all of the shit is there already. It's not in my hands. We spent $80,000
on the video. It was fucking stupid. You can make a great video for under $2,000.
It's silly."
"I always tell bands you're not going to make money off of artist royalties on a major label, nobody does. Nobody does."
- Davis McLarty
A decade later things haven't changed much. Abra Moore's video for "Four
Leaf Clover," the one of her in front of that foresty backdrop (or is it an
actual forest?), cost nearly $100,000 to make, and wow, it doesn't look like wardrobe
was a huge expense.
Also recoupable is tour support. For its debut, Make Your Mama Proud, Fastball
got $100,000 from their label Hollywood Records to help cover costs on the road.
"That may seem like a huge sum," notes Zuniga, "but that paid for
almost a year of touring and when you think about it, that's the catering budget
on Dumbo Drop 2, so for Hollywood and [its owner] Disney, it was no big deal."
What may be no big deal to Disney, though, results in huge amounts of red ink
for artists. Between recording budgets and tour support for its first two albums,
Fastball racked up a debt to Hollywood Records of almost $500,000. And that's not
all; labels charge back to the artist anything they can get away with. McMaster,
for instance, says he was being entertained by Columbia at his own expense.
"Every time they want to take you out and spend money on your band - take
you out to dinner, bars, whatever - that's your money they're spending," he
explains. "Here you go, five guys and you bring your friends or your girlfriends,
and you're spending up to $1,500 on dinner and drinks and entertainment."
Worse still, Dangerous Toys was completely unaware they were paying for it until
they saw the charges on accounting statements months later.
In their defense, labels are taking a huge risk when they sign a band. The vast
majority of albums don't sell well. In 1995, SoundScan reported sales of over 146,724
titles, 91 percent of which sold less than 5,000 copies. Granted, this is a little
misleading, because it includes all albums, even those catalogue nuggets like Pink
Floyd's Dark Side of the Moon. It's only a little misleading, though. That
year the average major label release sold only 9,134 copies.
Huge risks generally merit large returns, but there are aspects of recording contracts
that go beyond the bounds of a reasonable return on an investment. When Austin's
Spoon was negotiating its contract with Elektra Records, Britt Daniel discovered
that he wouldn't even be able to own the very albums he would be making and paying
for out of his royalties. According to Daniel:
"We told our lawyer that we wanted to own our own masters and he was like,
'Okay, when the Easter bunny gets through blowing Santa Claus then what else do you
want?' The fact that they give you an advance which you have to pay back to them,
but you don't own your masters - that's completely bullshit. I don't know of any
job where you have to pay back your own work expenses, because an advance is theoretically
what they are giving you to make the product."
Since the band was shopping finished product, Spoon ultimately licensed its current
album, A Series of Sneaks, to Elektra. After this one, however, they will
all be owned by the label.
There are exceptions to this rule, of course. If the label has dropped
you, deleted your catalogue, and has no future plans to do anything whatsoever with
your music, then you're just taking up valuable vault space. For that reason, Prescott
Curlywolf was able to get the masters from its major label debut, 6ix Ways to
Sunday, back from Mercury. According to Bernard, once the above factors were
in place, the rest wasn't too much of an ordeal.
"We had our lawyer basically go in and plead our case and they were happy
to do it," says Bernard. "It wasn't going to make them any money, not in
their plan, so I don't think they saw any harm in letting it go."
So, what does the record company do for you? Its end of the bargain comes in the
form of an agreement to manufacture, distribute, and promote the product - your album.
Of course, there's no guarantee that the label will even do the latter. Bernard estimates
that Mercury's total promotional expenditures on 6ix Ways to Sunday was $400.
He guesses that was spent on some posters he saw at the venues the band played during
its sole, one-week tour.
"We didn't even consider, 'Well shit, they don't have to promote you,'"
admits Bernard. "They can sign you, but they don't have to promote you. Only
after did we become aware of the evil truth that major labels just buy up acts to
keep them off the market. That's the truth of the matter. They want to keep the market
free and clear so they can push their big money makers."
Yes, the record industry could crush Mr. Rogers' spirit, but surprisingly, things
aren't completely hopeless. Despite the fact that the terms of most recording contracts
are generally not very artist-friendly, you can make money. Fastball's Zuniga estimates
that the $500,000 debt his band racked up will be paid in full by the end of July.
Claims the guitarist:
"If you have a hit single, everybody wants to play ball with you, and the
money starts flowing in from several different rivers: record sales, publishing,
live gigs, merchandising, etc."
Being on the radio makes getting paid elsewhere a little easier, but even without
a hit there are ways to make a living making music for a record company. Remember,
there are two sources from which the money flows; royalties are one, the other
is through songwriting mechanical license fees - "mechanicals" in industry
lingo.
Mechanicals are what the songwriter and the publisher get paid for the writing
of the song, with the current rate hovering around seven cents per song per CD sold.
Don't think that record companies don't want that, too. They do. They will often
not pay the full seven cents per song rate, nor will they always pay on every song
on an album. Nonetheless, there are fortunes to be made in songwriting royalties
and an artist on a major label can sell all or part of their publishing for very
good money. Zuniga and Fastball sold their publishing a few weeks ago for a huge
sum.
Also, the money from mechanicals is generally not cross-collateralized. This means
that, assuming a band or the members thereof wrote the material performed on the
album, any money due them for songwriting will not be withheld to pay back all of
the recoupable costs like the record royalties are. No matter how much you owe the
label, you get paid your mechanicals if you wrote the song.
Publishing gets very tricky very quickly, but an artist who takes the time to
understand it and manages his share of it wisely can make out well. If, however,
you don't write your own material, then you're back in the familiar it-ain't-going-to-work-for-you-unless-you-sell-a-million-albums
camp.
Whatever the case, it generally boils down to this: As long as artists are cognizant
of the fact that most major label recording contracts favor the company with little
or no regard for the creative force behind the whole endeavor, they can still play
the game one of two ways and maybe come out ahead. First, there's the take-all-you-can-get-up-front
tactic. Try to negotiate a huge advance, and sell off part of your publishing. Exploit
any leverage you might have. Even though Prescott got dropped by Mercury after one
album, which sold less than 5,000 units, they still pocketed money because they got
such a big check up front. "We made out like bandits," says Ron Byrd. "We
each probably made $20,000."
The band actually got $225,000 from the label. From that, $75,000 went to buying
out the band's contract with local indie Doolittle Records, while another $70,000
went into making 6ix Ways to Sunday. The rest was money in their pockets.
Of course, they're still in the hole to Mercury for $200,000, but because they were
dropped, they don't have to worry about paying any of it back.
The other strategy is to keep costs down. That way, even if you're not a huge
hit the first time up, it's not going to cost the label much to give you another
attempt at bat. Hollywood didn't promote Fastball's first album much, so Zuniga acknowledges
"it didn't cost them that much to keep us around." He credits that and
having a few key people at the label who believed in them with allowing the band
to make the now-gold album (sales of 500,000) All the Pain Money Can Buy.
As it turns out, there's actually a third strategy: Don't sign with a major label
at all. Unfortunately, there's a perverse logic whereby musicians and fans alike
infer that because independent labels are "cool" indie record deals are
"cool," too. The truth of the matter is, however, that a lot of indie labels
pattern their deals after what the majors do. There are some indie labels that have
taken a major label contract, changed the names, and used it as their "standard
agreement."
In fact, indie deals can be as bad or even worse than those set up by the majors.
As dismal as Prescott Curlywolf's experience with Mercury was, the band was already
quite unhappy with its deal with Doolittle, and viewed its signing with Mercury as
a way to get them off Doolittle. For its latest release, Funanimal World,
Prescott Curlywolf settled on another Austin indie, Freedom Records, a label where
the arrangement is unlike anything else in the business. After label owner Matt Eskey
recoups his costs, he splits everything 50-50 with the artist.
"He's 100% artist friendly." says Byrd, "We don't even have anything
on paper with him."
Of course you can always not sign with anybody. David Garza made nine records
by himself before inking his deal with Atlantic, and he's completely content with
the Ani DiFranco-esque course he took.
"Most bands sign too early in their career," says Garza. "I thank
God every day I didn't sign in 1991. I can't imagine it. I was nowhere near ready.
I would have been thinking, 'Okay, here's our big record deal, so now I'm going to
make a lot of money.' That's not what happens when you get signed."
Because he had a career under his belt before negotiating with Atlantic, Garza
brought a lot to the table and as a result got what he called "an incredible
deal" with the label.
But remember, everybody gets an incredible deal, or at least everybody says they
do - or better yet, think they do. How can any deal that doesn't make you money until
you're threatening to go platinum be that good? It isn't. Obviously, the terms of
most major label recording contracts are such that a crummy deal isn't even in the
numbers.
McLarty explains: "In my mind a good deal is finding people at a record company
who really dig what you're band is doing and really want to work hard to make the
band a success. You have to factor that in to whether you got a good deal. The numbers
are going to suck no matter how you look at it. That's just the way it is."
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